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INTRODUCTION
In recent years the federal government has been asserting its tax
liens' in ever increasing numbers. Most of the force of this new activity
* This Comment won first prize in competition with entries from all Florida law
schools in the 1963 Lawyers Title Guaranty Fund contest for a paper on real property.
** Assistant Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor, Freshmen
Legal Writing & Analysis Seminar, University of Miami School of Law.
1. The term "lien" is the name given a charge, security or encumbrance upon property,
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has quite naturally been felt by the delinquent taxpayer. However, in
a great number of cases innocent third persons have also been seriously
affected. Mortgagees, mechanic's lienors and judgment creditors among
others have suddenly found their property rights, ordinarily secure
under local law, either destroyed or seriously impaired after a priority
contest with a federal lien.2 As a result of these developments the federal
tax lien has become of major concern to every active practitioner in the
field of real property today.3
It is the purpose of this paper to: (1) survey the current state of
the law in this area; (2) indicate the particular hazards involved in
federal tax lien litigation; and (3) suggest procedures that may aid the
practitioner to solve future federal tax lien problems.
SCOPE
Since the legal aspects of this subject are so numerous and complex,
space does not permit an extended consideration of all federal tax liens.
Hence, the first section of this paper is limited to only a brief discussion
of the special federal liens pertinent to real property. In the second sec-
tion of the paper, however, the general federal tax lien4 is discussed
in considerable detail, since it is the one most frequently involved in
litigation. This discussion proceeds under three subdivisions: (1) the
basic statutory law upon which the lien is founded; (2) examination
of the scope and effect of the lien on the taxpayer; and (3) the lien's
effect on third persons involved in priority contests. It should also be
noted that since this subject is treated from the standpoint of the
practitioner in the real property field, certain portions of the law in this
area pertaining to personal property are omitted.
I. THE SPECIAL TAX LIENS
A. Generally
Congress has enacted three special tax liens concerning real prop-
erty.' Due to the nature of the taxes involved, they have not been an
for payment of some debt, obligation or duty. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951). The
basic purposes of a lien, as far as the federal government is concerned, are to immobilize
the taxpayer's property until the tax debt is paid, and to protect the government's interest
against subsequent creditors until further enforcement steps are taken.
2. The cases involving priorities are discussed in detail in the general tax lien section
of this paper.
3. In 1956 the American Bar Association recognized the increasing importance of the
federal lien by establishing a committee on the Relative Priority of Government and Private
Liens. Reports of this committee are found in the Annual Proceedings of the American Bar
Association's section of Real Property Law.
4. This lien encompasses delinquent federal taxes of all types. Income taxes, withholding
taxes, taxes covered by the special liens, and excise taxes are but a few of the levies in-
cluded. See also note 36 infra.
5. Liens to secure taxes did not exist at common law; therefore, all federal tax liens are
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important source of litigation.6 Consequently, they have a rather narrow
importance in the field. These liens are briefly discussed below.
B. Federal Estate Tax Lien
There is a special lien for federal estate taxes. 7 This lien attaches
automatically upon death and extends to the gross estate8 of the
decedent. It is valid immediately, without the necessity of recording,
and is effective for a period of ten years.' The statute expressly provides
for divestment of the lien if the property is conveyed by the surviving
spouse, administrator or other beneficiary, to a bona fide purchaser,
mortgagee, or pledgee for full and adequate consideration." Judgment
creditors seem to have been excepted from this provision, and municipal
tax liens attaching to the property subsequent to the death have been
held subordinate to the lien.' 2 All transfers, mortgages and other liens
executed upon the property before the decedent's death are definitely
superior to the federal lien.
13
C. Federal Gift Tax Lien
Federal law also provides a special lien for gift taxes,' 4 which is
imposed upon all gifts during the calendar year that exceed the allow-
able exemptions.'8 Like the estate tax lien, the gift tax lien is valid with-
out recording and is limited to a ten year period from the date of the
gift.' 6 If the donee transfers the gift to a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee,
or pledgee, the subject of the gift is divested of the lien. However, the
donee-transferor is held liable to the extent of the value of the gift.'
It should be noted that both estate and gift tax liens may be released
upon proper showing that sufficient assets exist to satisfy the debt. 8
creatures of statute. The establishment of a tax lien by Congress is an exercise of its con-
stitutional power to "lay and collect" taxes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
6. The general tax lien also covers these taxes. See note 4 supra.
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2001.
8. "Gross estate" means all the assets of the decedent except such part as is used
for the payment of charges against the estate and expenses of its administration. This portion
is divested of the lien.
9. Usually the final tax assessment is not made for quite some time, so the lien is
actually for taxes not yet in existence. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6324(a) (1).
10. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943).
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6324(a)(2). However, after the conveyance is made
a like lien attaches to the property of the transferor.
12. Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338 (1943).
13. Ibid.
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6324(b).
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2501-24.
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6324(b). See also Detroit Bank v. United States, 317
U.S. 329, 336 (1943).
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6324(b).
18. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6325. For a complete discussion of the effects of this
lien on the examination of abstracts see Peters & Maxey, The Gift Tax Lien and the Ex-
ainination of Abstracts, 5 Miamsi L.Q. 66 (1951).
1963]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVIII
D. Distilled Spirits Lien
The statutes provide a third special lien for the tax on distilled
spirits.' 9 This lien is a first lien upon the spirits, distillery (including
stills and fixtures) and the land on which the operation is located.20
-Furthermore, it is valid against all transfers, without assessment, dis-
traint or other administrative proceedings.21
E. The Priority Statutes
Two other statutes which do not impose liens, but do confer upon
the United States special priorities, have significance. Since references
will occasionally be made to these statutes, they are explained at this
time.
The first statute, commonly called "section 3466, '' 22 is applicable
to situations where the delinquent taxpayer is insolvent, 23 deceased, or
guilty of an act of bankruptcy without an actual bankruptcy proceeding.
In these situations the statute requires that debts due the United States,
including unpaid taxes, 24 be satisfied in preference to all other debts.
25
This statutory grant of priority has existed in one form or another since
1797,26 and was made necessary because the common law priority in
favor of a sovereign was not available to the United States as a govern-
ment of delegated powers .2  The success of the government in maintain-
ing this priority in competition with private liens is one of the factors
rendering this statute pertinent to the present subject.28
The other statute bestowing a priority on the United States is
section 104 of the Bankruptcy Act.29 Contrary to section 3466, the
United States does not enjoy an absolute priority in the ordinary bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 0 The priority is limited to certain unsecured
claims,8' and does not extend to valid pre-existing liens.8 2 Also, when
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 5004.
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 5004(a)(1).
21. United States v. Rizzo, 297 U.S. 530 (1936).
22. REV. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958).
23. "Insolvency" is defined in United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 261 (1923).
24. Illinois v. United States, 328 U.S. 8, 9 (1946).
25. 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958).
26. United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423, 428 (1941).
27. United States v. State Bank of N.C., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29, 39 (1832).
28. As to just how well the government has fared, see United States v. Gilbert Assod-
ates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
30. "Section 3466" has been held inapplicable to bankruptcy proceedings. United
States v. Gargill, 218 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1955); Adams v. O'Malley, 182 F.2d 925 (8th
Cir. 1950).
31. In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948) ; United States Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. Sweeny, 80 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1935) ; Claude D. Reese, Inc. v. United States,
75 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1935). See also cases at note 30 supra. Contra, United States v. Reese,
131 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1942). In addition to recognizing valid pre-existing liens, the Bank-
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special proceedings in bankruptcy occur, such as reorganization or
composition, provision for payment of federal taxes must be made be-
fore any proposed arrangement can be confirmed."5 Thus, for the most
part, federal lien questions arising during bankruptcy proceedings are
governed strictly by the bankruptcy statutes and hence, are little cause
for concern to the practitioner.
II. THE GENERAL TAX LIEN
A. Generally
During the Civil War federal fiscal requirements expanded greatly,
but tax collections were being increasingly frustrated by transfers of the
taxpayer's assets before enforcement proceedings could be instituted.
To remedy the situation Congress enacted the statutes commonly re-
ferred to as the "General Lien Provisions." 4 This lien is imposed for
the non-payment of income taxes, withholding taxes, 5 estate and gift
taxes, and a wide variety of miscellaneous excise levies. 6 By far, it is
the most important lien and the one of greatest concern to the real
property practitioner.
B. Statutory Provisions
The first two sections of the statute read as follows:
SEC. 6321. LIEN FOR TAXES
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to
pay the same after demand, the amount (including any
interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable
penalty together with any cost that may accrue in addi-
tion thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States
upon all property and rights to property, whether real
or personal, belonging to such person.
ruptcy Act permits the perfection of liens after the debtor becomes insolvent and during
bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).
32. Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611 (1948). However, if a § 3466 priority
has already attached, it is not lost by the subsequent bankruptcy of the taxpayer.
33. See chapters 8 and 10 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. A. §§ 201, 501 (1958).
34. 14 Stat. 107 (1866). These provisions are now found in §§ 6321-23 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, which were formerly §§ 3670, 3671, 3672 of the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code. This fact is noted because it is under the 1939 Code section designations
that the applicable provisions have been discussed in cases reported before the 1954 Code
became effective. Further references in the text will be to either the 1954 section numbers, or
"the Code."
35. When the employer sets aside the employee's income taxes withheld, the employee's
responsibility is discharged whether or not the employer pays the government. If the tax
is not paid over, a lien arises only on the defaulting employer's property. Furthermore, the
lien may include a civil penalty of 100% of the tax if the default is wilful.
36. Other commonly encountered federal taxes included under this lien are employment
taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act, and retailers, manufacturers and tobacco excise taxes.
1.963]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
SEC. 6322. PERIOD OF LIEN
Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien
imposed by section 6321 shall arise at the time the
assessment is made and shall continue until the liability
for the amount so assessed is satisfied or becomes un-
enforceable by reason of lapse of time.
1. CREATION OF THE LIEN
The steps taken by the government in imposing the lien normally
include the following sequence of events. First, the taxpayer is given
an opportunity to present his side of the tax controversy. Thereafter, if
no settlement is reached and the deficiency remains unpaid, the Com-
missioner signs an assessment list containing the tax, penalty, and in-
terest outstanding. This is the exact point in time when the lien arises,
but as a condition precedent to the lien's becoming enforceable, a de-
mand must first be made of the taxpayer.17 Therefore, the list is delivered
to the Director of Internal Revenue having jurisdiction over the tax-
payer, who forthwith issues the necessary demand for payment."8 There-
after, upon the neglect or refusal of the taxpayer to pay, the lien auto-
matically becomes effective and relates back to the time of assessment,
with the demand date having no relevance at all." The lien is then
considered perfected as of the assessment date,4" and is entirely valid,
without recording being necessary as against all subsequent creditors
(except as to mortgagees, purchasers, pledgees and judgment credi-
tors). 4 ' It is evident then, that except for the taxpayer, the lien is secret
from all other individuals. This means that a creditor, for example, a
building contractor, who extends credit on the face of clear title, has no
guarantee that he is not already subordinate to an unrevealed federal
assessment. To the attorney this situation is doubly dangerous, for he
must advise his clients with regard to their rights in the property with-
out any practical way of determining whether a federal tax lien already
exists.42
2. DURATION OF THE LIEN
There is another situation which can cause difficulty and loss to
the client if there is not complete awareness of the federal law. The
37. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943).
38. The demand need not be formal, and may be waived, but the total absence of
any demand will defeat the government's lien. Cattani v. Korsan, 29 N.J. Super. 581, 103 A.2d
51 (1954).
39. United States v. Roanoke Motor Co., 8 F. Supp. 228 (W.D. Va. 1934).
40. United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1941).
41. The federal tax lien must be filed before it becomes valid against subsequent
creditors in this class of individuals. See text following note 51 infra.
42. Government employees are not permitted to disclose the existence or the amount
of the lien. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 7213. Impossible a situation as this may be, the
problems faced by the attorney representing a client whose lien antedates the federal lien
are far worse. See the priority discussion, Section II(D) of this paper infra.
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statute says the lien shall remain enforceable "until the liability for
the amount so assessed is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason
of lapse of time."4 Under the statute of limitations,'4 a lien for taxes
ceases six years after date of assessment, unless within that period it is
enforced,4" or extended by written agreement with the taxpayer.46 Thus,
there being no requirement that the consent agreement be recorded,4
it cannot safely be assumed that a federal lien assessed over six years
from the date the records are searched, has expired.48 The dangerous
possibilities inherent in this situation were dramatically revealed in
several recent cases in which consent agreements, extending liens, re-
sulted in losses to purchasers and mortgagees who assumed that the
lien had expired six years after the date of the original and only notice
of lien on file.49
An interesting recent Eighth Circuit Case5" involved the question
of when a tax liability would be considered "satisfied" according to the
terms of the statute. Enforcing its lien, the government sold the tax-
payer's property at a price which exceeded the tax indebtedness. How-
ever, the sale was made partially on credit. The court ruled that al-
though the government agreed to the sale on credit and the taxpayer
lost his property by the sale, the liability for the tax was not satisfied
until the government received payment in cash. Therefore, the tax-
payer was not entitled to release of the lien against the balance of his
property.
3. RECORDING REQUIREMENT - PROTECTION FOR CERTAIN LIENORS
Prior to 1913, great hardships were caused to innocent purchasers
by the type of unrecorded lien just described. The harsh result reached
in the landmark case of United States v. Snyder51 aptly illustrates the
point. Real estate in Louisiana was sold after a tax lien was assessed
43. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6322, quoted in text following note 36 supra.
44. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6502 (a).
45. Once the debt is reduced to judgment, the lien will last forever because time
lmitations do not run against judgments in favor of the government. United States v. Ettle-
son, 67 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Wis. 1946).
46. Usually such an agreement comes about as a provision in a compromise offer. See
United States v. Havner, 101 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1939). Various other provisions also suspend
the time, such as military service, 50 U.S.C. § 573 (App. 1952) ; INT. REV. CODE OF" 1954,
§ 7508.
47. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Moore, 29 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Ill. 1939).
48. Information concerning the amount outstanding under a filed lien may be obtained
upon application to the District Director. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(d). Also, upon
being satisfied as to the nullity of a lien, the Director will issue, upon application, a
"Certificate of Non-Attachment" which should remove the cloud on the title created by
the lien.
49. United States v. Vassallo, Inc., 274 F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1960); United States v.
Mojac Constr. Co., 190 F. Supp. 622 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Herman, 186 F.
Supp. 98 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
50. United States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1960).
51. 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
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against the owner. The innocent purchaser for value took possession
and shortly thereafter the United States brought an action to foreclose
its lien. The purchaser contended the federal lien was ineffective because
it was not recorded as required by Louisiana law. The Supreme Court
held the United States was not subject to the recording laws of the state
and that therefore, the lien was valid and enforceable. This decision led
to proposals for modifications in the law, and in 1913, relief legislation
was enacted. The new provisions expressly removed mortgagees, pur-
chasers and judgment creditors from the effects of the secret lien by
making the lien invalid against them until recordation. This section
reads as follows:
SEC. 6323. VALIDITY AGAINST MORTGAGEES, PLEDG-
EES, PURCHASERS AND JUDGMENT CRED-
ITORS
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) 5" the
lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid against
any mortgagee, pledgee,58 purchaser or judgment creditor
until notice thereof has been filed by the Secretary or his
delegate . . . in the Office designated by the law of the
State or Territory in which the property subject to the
lien is situated . . . or . . . in the office of the clerk of the
United States district court . . . whenever the State or
Territory has not by law designated an office ....
In the case of real estate, the mechanics of searching for a filed lien are
extremely simple.54 The notice, with the name of the delinquent taxpayer
and the claim, will be filed, if at all, in the county where the property is
situated. A notice filed under an incorrect name is ineffective,55 unless
the searcher would not be misled.56 Also, it should be noted, the statute
does not say anything about the protected classes being "bona fide" or
"without notice." Therefore, lienors do not lose their protection, if in the
course of a credit investigation they gain knowledge of an unfiled lien."
52. This subsection refers to the special treatment accorded securities in order
to maintain their negotiable character. Congress has, in effect, removed them from the reach
of the lien by providing that although notice is filed, it shall not be valid as against a
mortgagee, pledgee, or purchaser of a security without actual notice of the existence of the
lien. (A security within the meaning of this provision consists of stocks, bonds, negotiable
instruments or money).
53. Pledgees were added to this protected class in 1939.
54. However, the present state of the law makes it virtually impossible to determine
whether a federal lien against personal property has been filed. Relying on the doctrine that
the situs of personal property is the domicile of the owner, tax liens filed in the county of
the delinquent taxpayer have been held sufficient, even though the chattel was actually
situated in another city. Grand Prairie State Bank v. United States, 206 F.2d 217 (5th
Cir. 1953). The problems of a record search presented by this holding are obvious.
55. Continental Invs. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Tenn. 1953) (lien
against W.B. Clark, Sr. did not affect property of W.R. Clark, Sr.).
56. Richters' Loan Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1956) (lien filed against
"Freidlander" effective against Friedlander).
57. United States v. Beaver Run Coal Co., 99 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1938); Smith v.
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All of the states have enacted legislation regulating the filing of
notice for federal tax liens.5 8 However, there have been attempts by the
states to require the notice of lien to take a certain form, or that the lien
be noted on the Torrens Title Certificate. Recently, the Supreme Court
settled this matter in United States v. Union Central Life Ins. Co.59 The
Michigan statute had required that the notice contain a legal description
of the property before it was acceptable for filing. The Court held that
the Revenue Code did not permit a statute to prescribe a form of notice,
thus invalidating the Michigan requirement. Hence, a notice filed in the
district court gave the tax lien priority over a real estate mortgage re-
corded under state law subsequent to the filing of the lien in the district
court.
It should be re-emphasized that the above mentioned classes of in-
dividuals are the only ones the statute seeks to remove from the hazards
of the secret lien. Although each class is not specifically defined by the
statute, the courts have shown little inclination to expand them by in-
terpretation.60
C. The Effect of the Tax Lien on the Taxpayer-"Property or
Property Rights"
1. GENERALLY
In any case where the federal government asserts its tax lien, the
threshold question is whether and to what extent the taxpayer had "prop-
erty" or "property rights" to which the lien could attach." Thus, in this
section we are interested only in the tax lien's relationship to the tax-
payer's rights, and not to the rights of third parties.
The Supreme Court has held "state law controls in determining the
nature and the legal interest which the taxpayer had in the property. '6
At first blush, this concept seems quite simple. However, without a clear
understanding of its terms, the practitioner can be easily misled. First,
and most important, state law controls only as to the creation and nature
of the estate or property right. Once the estate or right is established,
United States, 113 F. Supp. 702 (D. Hawaii 1953). However, where the parties are closely
related there is authority that the lienor is bound by knowledge. See Heyward v. United
States, 2 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1924). See also Comptroller General's Decisions B-135474,
37 DEcs. ComP. GEN. 817 (1958).
58. See 4 CCH 1952 STAND. FED. TAX REP. ff 1765(B)(29); 3 P-H 1955 FED. TAX
SERV. 1 19,912. In Florida, the provision is found in FLA. STAT. § 28.20 (1961).
59. 386 U.S. 291 (1961).
60. Mr. Justice Jackson, after reviewing the history of the lien section, said: "My
conclusions from this history is that the statute excludes from the provisions of this secret
lien those types of interests which it specifically included in the statute and no others."
United States v. Security Trust, 340 U.S. 47, 53 (1950) (concurring).
61. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
62. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 82 (1940).
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any other state laws, as for example, creditor exemption statutes, do not
control.6" Secondly, state law controls only as to the existence of property
or property rights in the taxpayer; it never governs the property rights of
third persons, which are governed by federal law.64 The practitioner must
grasp this distinction at the outset because a failure to understand it, or
to apply it in the proper case, can cause much lost time and futile argu-
ment.
Thus, if the government fails to establish under state law that the
taxpayer has an interest in the property it seeks to reach, the lien cannot
attach.65 Or, if the taxpayer holds under an imperfect title, the tax lien
will fail if the interest fails, even if the lien has already attached. 6
2. JOINTLY OWNED PROPERTY
It now appears firmly established that jointly owned property can
be partitioned in order to enforce a tax lien against the delinquent tax-
payer's share. A partition excludes any right of survivorship in the other
owner.67 However, there is a problem of determining the extent of the
taxpayers' interest, with the burden of proof falling on the government.68
If the indebted joint tenant dies before the lien is enforced, his interest
in the property is extinguished and the survivor is not held liable as a
transferee. " One writer70 has raised the question whether a lien arising
before death would continue to attach to the decedent's former share in
the survivor's hands, based on an analogy with the facts in an insurance
case.7 ' There, the beneficiary of the insurance proceeds took subject to
the lien that attached before death, and so it is argued that the survivor
in a joint ownership should take subject as well.
63. See also text following note 78 infra.
64. See text following note 94 infra.
65. Two insurance proceeds cases, though not exactly pertinent to this subject, are
good illustrations of this point. In one, the government's lien was assessed against the in-
sured taxpayer after his death for income taxes incurred while living. The court held that
the estate of the taxpayer had no property rights in the policy to which the lien could
attach. Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958). In the other case, since the tax was
assessed before the insured died, the insured at that time had property rights in the policy
to the extent of its cash surrender value, and so the lien attached to these rights and the
beneficiary took subject to it. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
66. Reiter v. Kille, 143 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. Pa. 1956); United States v. Dickerson,
101 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
67. United States v. Brandenburg, 106 F. Supp. 82 (S.D. Cal. 1952); United States v.
Beggerly, 52-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9304 (S.D. Cal. 1952). This rule was also applied to joint
bank accounts in United States v. Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 111 F. Supp. 152 (M.D.
Pa. 1953). But see Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952), wherein a joint
bank account by husband and wife was treated by state law as a tenancy by the entirety
and held free from the demands of creditors.
68. United States v. Stock Yards Bank, 231 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1956).
69. Irvine v. Helvering, 99 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1938).
70. Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAx L. REv. 247 (1958).
71. See the discussion of United States v. Bess, note 65 supra.
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3. TENANCIES BY THE ENTIRETIES
Whether a tax lien attaches to property held by the entireties is
solely a question of local law. In those jurisdictions that retain the theory
that the property is owned by a fictional unity of husband and wife and
that while each owns the whole, neither owns a separate interest, then
the lien does not attach.72 Florida adheres to this theory, and in United
States v. American Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville,73 the Fifth Circuit
followed it. After the government had filed a tax lien against the husband,
the bank took back a mortgage to both the husband and wife on property
which they held by the entireties. The wife thereafter died, and the
husband became the owner in fee simple. The husband then defaulted
and the bank foreclosed. The court held that since one tenant in a
tenancy by the entirety cannot charge the joint title for his separate
debts, the tax lien was not a valid lien against the tenancy prior to the
death of the wife. Thus, the mortgage executed by both was valid and
entitled to priority although subsequent in time to the filing of the.
husband's tax lien, because the lien did not attach until the time of the
wife's death.
There has been criticism of the immunity accorded to the estate
by the entireties. As a practical matter, however, little could be realized
if one of the spouse's interests could be sold subject to the rights of the
other.74It has been suggested that the lien be allowed to attach without
the power to enforce, on the theory that the mere recording of the lien
would prevent the joint owners from disposing of the property by
rendering the title unmarketable. Thereafter, the lien might be enforced,
when and if the delinquent taxpayer survives. 75
In other jurisdictions local law modifies the estate by the entireties
and allows creditors to levy on the interest of the indebted spouse. This
converts the estate into what, in effect, would be a tenancy in common
with a right of survivorship. In these states, of course, the tax collector
can reach the taxpayer's interest.76
4. DOWER RIGHTS
The federal tax lien of a delinquent taxpayer-husband does not
reach either the consummate or inchoate dower rights of a widow.77
72. United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951); Shaw v. United
States, 94 F. Supp. 245 (W.D. Mich. 1939); United States v. Nathanson, 60 F. Supp
193 (E.D. Mich. 1945).
73. 255 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 835 (1958).
74. For a note on the dilemma created when a creditor becomes entitled to equal
possession of a residence with a non-indebted spouse, see 23 CORNELL L.Q. 598, 602 (1938).
75. Note, however, that if the property has not been disposed of by the time the
taxpayer becomes the owner by survivorship, then the delinquent taxpayer's individual lien
attaches to it at the time of death, as after-acquired property. See note 86 infra.
76. Cooley v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1935); G.C.M. 1310, VI-1 Cum.
BuLL. 101 (1927).
77. Cobb v. Shore, 183 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United States v. Ettleson, 67 F.
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The lien may be enforced by a sale of the husband's property, but it
must be made subject to the wife's dower rights, unless she is willing
to join in the sale.
This rule seems more the result of a sentimental attitude towards
dower than of pure logic and reasoning. Strictly speaking, dower is
derivative and until death, remains inchoate. In reality, then, dower is
nothing more than a lien on the taxpayer's property. Therefore, in view
of the current trend concerning inchoate liens, this writer believes there
may be future decisions holding inchoate dower rights subordinate to
the federal lien.78
5. HOMESTEAD AND OTHER CREDITOR EXEMPT PROPERTY
The rule seems well established that exemptions from tax liens are
governed solely by federal law and that state exemption statutes are
not operative. 79 These decisions are based on the supremacy clause of
the Constitution which forbids each state to preclude the right of the
United States to collect its revenue by passing exemption laws. Thus,
homestead protections, designed by state law to free certain property
from creditors' liens, are of no effect against the federal tax liens.8" Two
federal cases originating in Florida involving homestead have followed
the rule.8 ' Personal property exemptions, as provided by the statutes,
likewise do not apply.82
6. PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
Liens for income taxes of individual partners do not attach to the
assets of the partnership, but reach only the interests of the partner.8"
On the other hand, if the lien is for taxes of the partnership itself, such
as social security or withholding taxes, then the total assets are vulner-
able, as is the individual property of the partners to the extent they are
liable for the debts of the partnership.8 4 In the recent case of Baugh v.
Supp. 257 (E.D. Wis. 1946). "Inchoate" is defined as that which is not complete or per-
fected. BouviR, LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1914).
78. As was pointed out in the text following note 61 supra, state law does not govern
the property rights of third party lienors. Federal law controls. See discussion concerning
inchoate liens in priority section II(D) of this paper infra.
79. United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1941).
80. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Lovell, 108 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Miss. 1952), aff'd, 214
F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1947).
81. Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Bedami v. Tomlinson, 54-1
U.S. Tax Cas. g 9227 (S.D. Fla. 1954).
82. The taxpayer is allowed only such exemptions as are provided by federal law in
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6334. Accordingly, the lien also applies to the taxpayer's salary
or wages without even a minimum for subsistence. Antrum v. United States, 127 F. Supp.
54 (D. Conn. 1953).
83. United States v. Kaufman, 267 U.S. 408 (1925); United States v. Worley, 213 F.2d
509 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917 (1955) ; Adler v. Nicholas, 166 F.2d 674 (10th
Cir. 1948).
84. Heller v. United States, 55-1 U.S. Tax Cas. IT 49,084 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
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Little Lake Lumber Co.,"5 the Ninth Circuit decided that notice of
federal lien for delinquent partnership taxes, filed against only one
partner, was notice to a lender on a mortgage subsequently executed
by the partnership on partnership property. Therefore, the court con-
cluded, the federal lien was prior to the mortgage to the extent of the
named partner's property interest in the partnership.
7. AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
Sometimes a taxpayer has no assets reachable for the satisfaction
of his tax liability at the time the lien is imposed. However, the lien
has been construed to attach to all after-acquired property automatically
upon acquisition, with no other action needed to perfect it.88 Further-
more, a previously recorded security interest in the after-acquired prop-
erty is subordinate to the federal lien, whether the security interest
relates to future advances or not. 7
D. The Effect of the Tax Lien on Third Parties--"Priorities"
1. GENERALLY
Priority determinations involving the general federal lien are vastly
different from the ordinary priority contest. Consequently, before we
examine the cases in this area, it is important to note the four basic
principles controlling such litigation. These are separately discussed.
a. Property of the Taxpayer Doctrine
The first inquiry made in any federal tax lien case, before con-
sideration is ever given to the priority issues involved, is whether the
taxpayer had any property or rights to property to which the federal
lien could attach. 88 Too often in the past, the practitioner and the
courts have failed to make this fundamental determination. Yet a proper
disposition of this question could well be decisive in many a case.89 As
was pointed out earlier, 90 the existence and nature of the property in-
terest of the taxpayer is controlled by state law.
b. First in Time-First in Right
The statutes themselves do not confer upon the federal government
a special priority in rank.9' Thus, a second controlling principle is the
common-law rule-First in order of time, first in order of rank.9 2 This
85. 297 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 909 (1962).
86. Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945).
87. United States v. Phillips, 198 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1952) (after-acquired increased cash
value of an insurance policy held by a bank as security).
88. See note 61 supra.
89. See text following note 163 infra.
90. See text following note 61 supra.
91. Ersa v. Dudley, 234 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1956).
92. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); Rankin v. Scott, 29
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177 (1827).
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rule governs the priorities in federal lien litigation except as specifically
modified by statute.'
c. Federal Law Controls
Before any lien other than the federal lien can qualify as "first in
time, first in right," it must be perfected at the time it attaches.4 This
qualification applies to all classes of private lienors, mentioned or not
mentioned in the lien statutes. The question then arises: which law,
state or federal, determines this perfection? The Supreme Court has
answered this question by ruling:
The relative priority of the lien of the United States for un-
paid taxes is . . . always a federal question to be determined
by the federal courts. The state's characterization of its liens,
while good for all state purposes, does not necessarily bind
this Court."
In short, state-determined property rights of third party lienors do
do not apply to priority litigation involving a federal lien. The rationale
behind this rule is that fifty states cannot be allowed to govern what
constitutes a perfected competing lien, or there would be absolutely no
uniformity in the collection of federal taxes. For this same reason, state
homestead, recording, and exemption laws, while applicable to private
lienors, have been held not to affect the federal lien.96 Thus, state prop-
erty laws affecting the perfection of private liens, such as overriding
priorities,97  or relation back statutes,9 8 while accepted in ordinary
priority cases, do not govern federal priority cases. 9 The writer believes
that the failure of many attorneys to accept this proposition-or worse,
the mistaken application of state standards-has led to most of the con-
fusion and controversy in this area.100 Therefore, it must be re-
93. Although the federal lien might attach first, it is not first in rank until recorded
when it is in competition with a purchaser, mortgagee, pledgee or judgment creditor. See text
following note 51 supra.
94. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86 (1954).
95. United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211, 213 (1955).
96. See notes 51 and 79 supra.
97. See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954), where a state
statute providing that real estate tax liens shall have precedence over all encumbrances
was held ineffective as to the federal lien.
98. Typical is the Florida mechanic's lien statute, which provides that once the lien
is filed it relates back to the day the work commenced. See FLA. STAT. §§ 84.01-84.35 (1961).
99. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950). See also text
following note 107 infra.
100. Since its inception, the American Bar Association's Committee on Federal Liens
has been unyielding in its assertion that all property rights, both of the taxpayer and third
parties, should be determined according to the laws of the states. In support of this position,
the committee has gone as far as to argue Erie v. Tompkins as authority, contending that
since there is no federal common property law, the courts must defer to the common law
of the states. The fact that Erie applied only to diversity cases and that federal lien litigation
involves a federal question seems to have been completely overlooked, perhaps because this
is the flaw in the whole argument against federally defined property rights. Priority litigation
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emphasized that a private lienor's property rights are determined solely
by federal law and that in order to be declared superior to a federal
lien, the competing lien must not only be first in time, but perfected
according to federal standards.
d. The Federal "Choateness" Test
Before discussing the actual standards the federal courts apply in
determining whether a lien is perfected or "choate,"'' ° a few words
should be given to the background of the test.
The test originated in another class of cases involving the federal
priority statute.'0 2 The early cases construing this statute held that
antedating private liens were superior to the priority granted the federal
government in section 3466.103 However, in the landmark case of City
of Spokane v. United States,0 4 the Court launched the doctrine of the
"inchoate" lien, holding that a federal priority defeats an antedating
private lien that is not specific and definite."a 5 In subsequent cases, this
concept proved a most potent weapon in maintaining the government's
priority in section 3466 litigation, as the Court always found new
features of "inchoateness."'0 6 With this success in the insolvency field,
the government began to argue that the rationale of section 3466 should
be followed in determining priority of liens under the general lien
statute. The government analogized that since an "inchoate" lien was
subordinate to a debt in section 3466 cases, surely the more formal
government lien should fare no worse. This proposition was finally
accepted in the landmark case of United States v. Security Trust & Say.
Bank. 0 7 Briefly, the facts were that real estate had been attached in
a suit filed in a state court, but before judgment was obtained, notices
of a federal tax lien were filed. Under state law, the recording of the
suit of attachment was sufficient to effectuate a lien against the property.
The Court said, however:
In cases involving a kindred matter, i.e., the federal priority
involving a federal lien is in reality a contest between state and federal interests. Therefore,
the concept of federal supremacy as enunciated by the Constitution, must be controlling.
101. 'Choate" is not as yet included in any of the legal dictionaries, but the courts
have used the word to describe perfected rights-in other words, as an opposite to the word
"inchoate."
102. See note 22 supra.
103. See Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Government: The Pernicious Career of
the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905, 911 n.37 (1954), for a list of cases. This
article will hereafter be referred to as Kennedy.
104. 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
105. The claimant in this case, trying to assert its prior lien ahead of the debt owed
the government, was a city, which under state statute had a lien upon the debtor's real
estate for unpaid real estate taxes. The Court held, that as the state statute provided for
execution, which had not yet occurred, the lien was not as perfected as it could have been,
and thus was subordinate to the government's claim.
106. For an illustration of the facility of the Court, see note 177 infra.
107. 340 U.S. 47 (1950), reversing 93 Cal. App. 2d 608, 209 P.2d 657 (1949).
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and R.S. Sec. 3466, it has never been held sufficient to defeat
the federal priority merely to show a lien effective to pro-
tect the lienor against others than the Government, but con-
tingent upon taking subsequent steps for enforcing it.'
Thus, the Court held the attachment was the equivalent of a lis pendens
or simply a caveat of a more perfect lien to come, and so the federal
lien was superior. This was a significant ruling for the government be-
cause prior to it, at least thirty cases in the lower courts had held ante-
dating liens, perfected under state law, superior to the federal lien.'0 9
The test of "choateness" as the federal courts apply it seems to
involve three requirements: (1) the lien must identify the lienor; (2)
the amount of the lien must be certain; and (3) the lien must attach
to specific property." 0
The first requirement presents no problem at all, and the third
requirement, that the lien attach to specific property, has frustrated only
those lienors whom the state has tried to protect with a general statutory
lien on all the debtor's assets. However, the second qualification has proved
a major obstacle to most private lienors. It now seems that nothing short
of judgment on the competing lien before the federal lien attaches will
comply with the requirement that the amount be certain."' In the light
of today's overburdened dockets, this requirement presents quite a diffi-
cult task. Furthermore, there are indications that the courts may not
even be satisfied with judgment and would require recording in the
judgment lien record book of the state." 2
With these principles in mind, we can now examine the cases in-
volving particular competing liens.
108. Id. at 51.
109. See Kennedy, at 294 n.1lS.
110. See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954), noting these three
standards in the opinion.
111. In United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010, 1011 (1956), Mr.
Justice Douglas said in dissent: "The Court apparently holds that under 26 U.S.C. § 3670,
a lien that is specific and choate under state law, no matter how diligently enforced, can
never prevail against a subsequent federal tax lien, short of reducing the lien to final judg-
ment." See text preceding note 159 infra, for a discussion of the facts of the case. The only
exception to this rule seems to be real property taxes. See text following note 179 infra.
Contractual liens, such as mortgages, have also been excepted, but see text with note 143
infra, indicating a possible change.
112. In United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1960), the Court discussed
the choate lien test as follows: "In establishing the 'choate lien test', these cases have
developed exacting requirements, the substance of which is to require that state created liens
be specific to the point that nothing further need be done to make the lien enforceable."
(Emphasis added.) See FLA. STAT. § 55.10 (1961), pertaining to filing of judgment in official
records.
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2. PARTIES MENTIONED IN THE STATUTE
a. Mortgagees Generally
Until recent years, mortgage lenders have not encountered much
difficulty with federal revenue liens against the mortgaged property.
This quietude was warranted mainly by the security provided in section
6323 which gives priority to mortgages recorded11 3 before a tax lien
Jis filed. Furthermore, the ordinary mortgage easily met the choate
standards, because the identity of the lienor, property and amounts were
specified under contract. Thus, the mortgagee, with a title report in-
dicating no tax liens on the property, might give as little thought to the
effect of a subsequent federal lien as he would to any other junior en-
cumbrance. However, in the light of several recent Supreme Court deci-
sions, discussed below, mortgage lenders should reappraise their position.
Open End Mortgages.-The decision in United States v. Ball Const.
Co." 4 is of landmark importance. The case involved a bonding company
that had bonded a contractor, in return for a pledge of the contract pro-
ceeds as security. Subsequent to the execution of the bond, a federal
lien was recorded against the contractor, who thereafter defaulted, and
the bonding company was required to advance its monies to complete
the work. When the contract proceeds became payable, the government
claimed an interest in competition with the company.
These facts seem far removed from an ordinary mortgage lender's
situation. However, the case is significant to mortgagees because the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, which held that
the bonding company should prevail because it had the status of a
mortgagee."5 Four dissenting judges adopted the lower court's view,
but the majority reversed per curiam because of "the instrument in-
volved being inchoate and unperfected."
'
"
6
This holding still would not seem to affect the usual mortgage,
which is specific as to property and amount. However, the open-end
mortgage" 7 has definitely been put into jeopardy.
113. Under the wording in § 6323, the fact of recording would seem to be immaterial.
However, when the mortgage is recordable, the courts, fearing collusion on the part of the
taxpayer and the mortgagee, have held that a mortgage is not entitled to a priority over
a federal tax lien unless recorded before the notice of tax lien is filed. Underwood v. United
States, 118 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1941); Edmundson v. Scofield, 92 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. Tex.
1950).
114. 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
115. The determination of whether a person falls within the class [mortgagee] is made
by reference to the realities and facts in a given case rather than to the technical form
and terminology used to designate such a person. Rev. Rul. 56-592, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 945.
116. United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
117. An open-end mortgage provides that future loans may be made on the same security
as the original loan, and may be repaid over the life of the mortgage at the same loan interest
rates charged in the original mortgage.
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Prior to this decision, the law in regard to open-end mortgages
was thought to depend on the nature of the advance. If the advances
made after notice of the intervening lien were at the option of the
mortgagee, then they would be subordinated to the federal lien."' The
theory was that the advances, although made under a prior recorded
mortgage, were too uncertain and indefinite and thus "inchoate." On
the other hand, it was generally believed that future advances that were
obligatory on the mortgagee, though conditioned on events beyond his
control, were entitled to the same priority as the prior recorded loan.
The impact of the Ball case is that now both optional and obligatory
advances made by a mortgagee on an open-end mortgage, after notice
of a federal lien, will be considered subordinate. The rationale of Ball
seems to be that the advances to be made, though obligatory, were
contingent. Therefore, until the additional loan was made, there was no
perfected loan at the time the lien attached. Further, a state doctrine of
relation back to the original loan date would not save the mortgage in
the light of another Supreme Court holding." 9
The recent case of American Sur. Co. v. Sundberg120 seems to sup-
port this conclusion. A surety company took a mortgage to secure future
advances which it might be required to make under a performance bond.
The court held that federal liens arising after the execution of the mort-
gage were entitled to priority over the obligatory advances subsequently
made. The decision was grounded on the "lack of certainty as to
whether future advances would be made and, if so, the amount there-
of .... M21
The implications of these decisions are far-reaching. Apply this
kind of reasoning, for example, to a mortgage lender who has made a
mortgage commitment relying on clear title, but for some reason does
not disburse all the proceeds of the loan immediately upon execution
of the mortgage. During this interval, suppose a federal lien is recorded
against the mortgagor. Conceivably, the federal lien could be held supe-
rior to the balance of the proceeds issued subsequent to the lien's attach-
ment.
Construction Mortgages.-Construction mortgages are also in dan-
ger as a result of the aforementioned decisions. The normal construction
loan, where periodic advances are made as the need arises, is certainly
susceptible to the charge that it is "inchoate." Thus, any advances made
after a notice of lien is filed would be subordinated to the federal lien.
118. Rev. Rul. 56-41, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 562.
119. United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955). See note 95 supra, and text accompany-
ing note 98 supra.
120. 58 Wash. 2d 337, 363 P.2d 99 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962).
121. Id. at 348, 363 P.2d at 106. See also United States v. L. R. Foy Constr. Co., 300
F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1962).
COMMENTS
Purchase Money Mortgages.-Purchase money mortgages have
a unique status in relation to the federal lien, because such a mortgage,
executed after a federal lien is filed, still enjoys priority over the tax
lien.' 22 This priority is a result of the rule which regards purchase
money mortgages as a limitation on the estate which a purchaser takes.
In other words, while the taxpayer may acquire legal title to the prop-
erty, the beneficial interest in whole or in part still remains in the
seller. 23 This applies, whether the mortgage is executed to the seller or
to a third party, as long as the proceeds of the mortgage are to be used
to apply on the purchase. 2 4
Judicial Foreclosure.-In order to sue the United States in a fore-
closure suit, the mortgagee must bring himself within the provisions of
a federal statute authorizing such suit. There are two such consent
statutes, but one is so little used today 125 that it will not be discussed.
The other consent statute12 provides that the United States may be
named a party defendant in any suit instituted in a federal or state
court for the purpose of quieting title, or for the foreclosure of a mort-
gage or any other lien when the United States claims a lien upon the
property. Briefly, the procedure is to serve the local United States
Attorney with copies of the process and complaint, which also are sent
by registered mail to the Attorney General of the United States. The
statute grants the government sixty days from date of service to file
an answer. Thereafter, a judicial sale of the property will discharge the
junior federal lien in the same way as any junior lien would be dis-
charged under the law of the state where the property is located. How-
ever, the statute does provide for a one-year right of redemption in
favor of the government, which is rarely exercised and can be disposed
of by submitting a nominal offer to the tax division of the Department
of Justice.
Non-Judicial Foreclosure .127--There is no law requiring that the
122. United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362 (1870); Troyer v.
Mundy, 60 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1932). However, an equitable vendor's lien has been held
subordinate to a later federal lien on the grounds that the former was enforceable only by
suit and hence "inchoate" until judgment. It was also subject to defeat by a bona fide
purchaser. United States v. Morrison, 247 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1957).
123. The Internal Revenue Service recently substantiated this approach in an opinion
rendered to the Veterans Administration, which was contemplating taking back a purchase-
money mortgage from a purchaser against whom notice of a federal lien existed. See Pro-
ceedings American Bar Association, Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, at
80 (1961).
124. Wermes v. McCowan, 286 Ill. App. 381, 3 N.E.2d 720 (1936).
125. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7424. The reason for this lack of use is the slow and
cumbersome procedure involved.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1958).
127. It is relevant to mention at this point the possibility of obtaining an administrative
release or discharge of a federal lien without the necessity of going through a suit, either
judicially or nonjudicially. Section 6325(b) of the Code includes such a provision, if it can be
shown that the interest of the United States in the property is valueless.
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government be named as a party in a private mortgage foreclosure pro-
ceeding.' What then is the law concerning a foreclosure under power
of sale, rather than judicial proceedings? Is the government's lien dis-
charged or does it survive? There seemed to be considerable uncertainty
until recently, because conflicting court of appeal decisions had never been
resolved by the Supreme Court. 129 However, in June, 1960, the ques-
tion was finally settled in United States v. Brosnan.'8 0 This case held
that no notice need be given the United States as a junior lienor in a
private mortgage foreclosure sale. ' The decision was particularly
significant, not only because it calmed fears that thousands of titles
based upon state non-judicial foreclosure procedures might be upset,
but also because it was grounded on the proposition that state deter-
mined property rights were conclusive on the government. 2 This latter
fact gave rise to the belief that the Court was changing its position that
federal law always controls federal lien property cases. 13  However,
this thesis now seems doubtful, and the indications are that state law
will be allowed to control in this limited area only.'
It should also be noted that a non-judicial sale will not eliminate
the federal lien if the sale is a sham,8 5 or if the federal lien is prior
to the competing lien being enforced.8 6
The Circuity Problem.-A "circular" priority problem can arise
when a state provides that local taxes are paramount, even over a prior
mortgage. If the mortgage is first in time over a federal lien, which, in
turn, is prior in time to the local tax lien, the "circle" is then complete.
This unusual problem in priorities appears to be controlled by the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. City of New Britain.87
Applying the principle, "first in time, first in right," the Court held that
the mortgage, being first, was entitled to first priority, and that the
federal lien, being second, should be paid next. If there were not
enough of the proceeds left to pay the local tax lien, then the local lien
could invade the mortgagee's share for satisfaction.'8 8 The rationale for
128. In Florida, however, the statutes provide that all mortgages, with certain excep-
tions, must be foreclosed judicially. FLA. STAT. ch. 702 (1961).
129. No discharge-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 107 F.2d 311 (6th
Cir. 1939). Discharged-United States v. Boyd, 246 F.2d 477 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 889 (1957).
130. 363 U.S. 237 (1960).
131. The Court affirmed the Third Circuit's decision in 264 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1959)
and in the same opinion reversed United States v. Bank of America, 265 F.2d 862 (9th Cir.
1959) which had held the opposite of Brosnan.
132. The Pennsylvania statute did not require notice to be given to either the mortgagor
or the government.
133. See note 100 supra.
134. See note 186 infra and text following.
135. Decker v. Brereton, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. IT 9455 (D. Utah 1962).
136. United States v. Peterson, 204 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
137. 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
138. For example, suppose a property sells for $12,000. The mortgage is $10,000, the
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this solution was that the priority of local taxes over a prior mortgage
was a matter of local law and no concern of the federal government.
The federal statutes, the Court 'said, permit only the priority of the
mortgage over the federal lien and therefore any amount obtained upon
sale over the mortgage amount must go to satisfy the federal lien.
This decision has been criticized because the mortgagee suffers
a loss, when the proceeds are insufficient, despite the priority the law
gives him. It seems to this writer, however, that the solution is as
reasonable as could be under the circumstances. Actually the mortgagee's
rights are being sacrificed to the demands of the state rather than the
federal government. The mortgagee receives all the protection the
statute provides, but it is the overriding priority of the state tax lien
which creates the problem. The mortgagee's proceeds would be in-
vaded by the local tax lien even if no federal lien were present, if the
proceeds covered only the mortgage amount. Thus, if the state law con-
ferred no priority on the local lien, then the mortgagee's interest would
not be impaired. 8 '
Mortgage Foreclosure Expenses.-While a mortgage lender may
search for federal liens against a prospective mortgagor in order to
protect himself, he cannot refrain from making advances once a de-
faulted mortgage must be foreclosed and attorney's fees and court
costs are incurred. Furthermore, accrued interest may have accumulated
or advances may have to be made for state taxes, insurance and repairs
-all necessary items to protect the mortgagee's security. What is their
status if the payments are made after the federal tax lien attaches?
The trend of decisions against "inchoate" liens indicates that the mort-
gagee will have a difficult time collecting these expenses. United States
v. Bond 4' is a prime example. Under state law and the instrument it-
self, the attorney's fees and advances for real estate taxes were to be-
come part of the original indebtedness. The Fourth Circuit held, how-
ever, that these advances were not "choate" before the lien was recorded
and furthermore, that the doctrine of relation back would not preclude
the federal lien from priority.
Even if the state statute provides that local taxes be made a prior
part of the "expenses of sale," they still are not prior to the sales pro-
ceeds due the federal lien. This is the latest holding of the Supreme
federal lien $5,000, and state taxes $1,000. The mortgagee would get his $10,000 first with the
federal lien receiving the $2,000 balance. The local taxes would then have to be paid
from the mortgagee's share, reducing it to $9,000. Prior to this decision, the results would
have been: local taxes first for $1,000, mortgagee second for $10,000 and the federal govern-
ment sustaining the $1,000 reduction.
139. See Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 247 F.2d 777 (9th Cir.
1957).
140. 279 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895 (1960). See also United States
v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 83 Sup. Ct. 1651 (1963).
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Court concerning this problem handed down in United States v. Buffalo
Say. Bank."' The opinion stated particularly that "the state may not
avoid the priority rules of the federal tax lien by the formalistic device
of characterizing subsequent accruing local liens as expenses of sale."' 42
Thus, it is evident that the mortgagee can no longer be secure with
his statutory protection. The inchoate doctrine has definitely made
serious inroads into the mortgage lien area. Cases like United States v.
Chapman'48 make one wonder just how far this intrusion will go. In
this case a finance company lent money to a contractor who assigned
the proceeds of the construction to the finance company as security.
Thereafter, federal liens arose. The Tenth Circuit held the assignment
was inchoate, stating that "not only had no action been taken to perfect
the lien but, also, the amount of the debt to be collected from the security
had not been determined." 44 The implications of this statement are
profound, for the amount of the debt to be collected from any type of
security is not precisely determined until foreclosure. Thus, the logical
conclusion would be that all types of security interest are "inchoate"
until sale.
b. Purchasers
Because purchasers are included in the four classes protected by the
statute, priorities are generally governed by the same rules applicable
to mortgagees. Therefore, if a person is adjudged a "purchaser," his
claim is choate and superior to the federal lien if the purchase was made
before the notice was filed. The question then is, what exactly does the
term purchaser mean? The Supreme Court has said, "[A] purchaser
within the meaning of § 3672 [now § 6323] usually means one who
acquires title for a valuable consideration in the manner of vendor and
vendee."' 4 If the Court's definition means that the requirements of a
purchaser are not met until title passes, then installment land contract
vendees may be susceptible to the infirmities of the "choateness" test.
A district court case seems to' confirm this conclusion. In Leipert v. R.
C. Williams & Co.,"4 ' the buyers had contracted to purchase homes under
long term contracts which prohibited recordation. The purchasers took
possession and began making periodic payments when a federal lien
was recorded against the vendor. The court held that the liens of the
purchasers were inchoate and inferior to the federal lien because title
had not been conveyed. In effect, the decision says that the purchaser
had no rights (i.e., only "inchoate" rights), when in fact, those same
141. 371 U.S. 228 (1963). See also United States v. Christensen, 269 F.2d 624 (9th
Cir. 1959).
142. 371 U.S. 228 (1963).
143. 281 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1960).
144. Id. at 869.
145. United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218, 221 (1954).
146. 161 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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rights were sufficient to be enforceable in a court of equity. This fact
was noted in another more recent district court decision. In United
States v. Boston & Berlin Transp. Co.,14 7 the court held the contrary-
that the purchaser had an interest in property even in the absence of
legal title, and thus the lien was choate and superior to the federal
lien. The court based its decision on the Treasury's own regulations,
which define a purchaser as one who for valuable consideration acquires
property or an interest in property.14' Furthermore, the court intimated
Leipert was in error by this comment on the earlier case: "The Court
held that those receiving deeds after the recording date were not 'pur-
chasers,' overlooking the fact that they, even without title, had an
'interest in property' within the meaning of the Treasury Regula-
tion .... "'49
It seems to this writer that any extension of the "choate" doctrine
into this area would flagrantly disregard the original purposes of the
statute. Those purposes were the alleviation of the harsh conditions
which previously had existed for bona fide purchasers under the secret
lien.' 50 The denial of protection to contract land purchasers certainly
is not in keeping with these aims. Further, adoption of the policy ex-
pressed in Leipert would present an intolerable situation for the prac-
titioner representing a contract purchaser. In order to avoid liability in
his title opinion, he would either have to expressly exempt federal liens
and let his client assume the risk, or insist that the seller prove all his
taxes were currently paid, which even then would not solve the problem
as to future taxes.
c. Judgment Creditors
Although creditors are also presumably protected by section 6323,
the question again arises: Who qualifies as a judgment creditor within
the meaning of the section? The Supreme Court has said, "We think Con-
gress used the word 'judgment creditor' . . . in the usual conventional
sense of a judgment of a court of record." " ' The regulations issued under
the 1954 Code take a different view, however. "Judgment creditor" is
defined there as one "who has a perfected lien under such a judgment on
the property involved."' 52 Once again, the government seems to have
injected the choate test into another area by apparently requiring a
recording 55 or levy after judgment. Thus, in some states the judgment
147. 188 F. Supp. 304 (D.N.H. 1960).
148. Treas. Reg. § 301.6323-1(a) (2) (i) (a) (1954).
149. 188 F. Supp. 304, 307 (D.N.H. 1960). The Leipert decision could also be dis-
tinguished by the unusual contract employed, which provived that the relation between the
parties was to be like that of landlord and tenant and that on default the seller might enter
the premises and remove property as for non-payment of rent.
150. See note 51 supra.
151. United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361, 364 (1953).
152. Treas. Reg. § 301.6323-1(a)(2)(i)(c) (1954).
153. It is to be noted that a judgment in Florida does not become a lien on real
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creditor would be forced to seize and hold property to protect his lien
where the government does not. This seems a complete distortion of
what Congress intended when it included judgment creditors in the
recording statute. The Supreme Court has not yet been asked to decide
the precise question." 4
3. PARTIES NOT MENTIONED IN THE STATUTES
a. Generally
It thus appears that the position of mortgagees, purchasers, and
judgment creditors is not as secure as might be expected of a class under
statutory protection. However, the position of lienors not covered by
the statute is downright precarious. Their claims had always been subject
to the risk of subordination to an unfiled secret lien, but recently they
have been displaced by federal liens attaching subsequently. This new
development has been almost exclusively the result of applying the
"choateness test" to the competing lien. Thus, nowhere else in the priority
field is the controversy and criticism greater than in this area.
b. Mechanic's Lienors
A mechanic's lien is solely a creature of statute designed to secure
the compensation of those who expend their labor and materials toward
enhancing the value of the property of others. For this reason, state
property law generally has preferred it to other liens, mortgages and
encumbrances which subsequently arise, and to prior but unrecorded
liens. In some states the statutes provide for relation back of the lien to
the date of commencement of improvement in order to render it superior
to all intervening liens. 55 This was the type of statute involved in
United States v. Vorreiter,56 in which mechanic's lien statements had
been filed, but not reduced to judgment. The federal lien had been
assessed prior to the making of the contract, but notice was not filed until
after the mechanic's lienor had finished the work and filed his lien.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that by the law of that state the
mechanic's lienor had a property interest in the taxpayer's property to
the extent that the value of the property was increased by the work
performed. To give priority to the United States, the court said, would
unjustly enrich it. The United States Supreme Court reversed in a one
sentence per curiam opinion, citing the Security Trust 57 case as authority.
estate until a certified copy thereof is recorded in the judgment lien record. FLA. STAT.
§ 55.10 (1961).
154. But see Miller v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 166 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1948),
which held that the mere entry of judgment is insufficient to compete with a federal tax
lien. The judgment must be a lien upon the property involved. See also note 172 infra.
155. The Florida mechanic's lien statute has a like provision. FLA. STAT. §§ 84.01-
84.35 (1961).
156. 355 U.S. 15, reversing 134 Colo. 543, 307 P.2d 475 (1957).
157. See note 107 supra.
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A year later, United States v. Hulley,56 a Florida case with similar facts,
was decided in the same manner. Thus it appears, under these federal
decisions which are controlling, that a mechanic's lien cannot relate back
to defeat a prior but unrecorded federal lien, although under state law
competing unrecorded private liens would be subordinate. Obviously,
this results in a difficult situation for the lienor because he has no way
of determining whether a federal lien has attached prior to the commence-
ment of his work. This, however, has always been a hazard to the
mechanic's lienor since he is not protected by statute from the secret
lien. But consider this plight: A contractor makes improvements to the
property and upon failure to be paid files his lien and commences suit.
Prior to all these events no federal lien has been assessed. Then, while
the foreclosure suit is pending, the federal lien is filed. These were the
facts in United States v. White Bear Brewing Co.,' 9 and the Supreme
Court held, without opinion, that the prior mechanic's lien was subordi-
nated to the subsequent federal lien. 60 There was a dissenting opinion,
from which one can gather the rationale of the Court:
The Court apparently holds . . . a lien that is specific and
choate under state law, no matter how diligently enforced, can
never prevail against a subsequent tax lien, short of reducing
the [state] lien to final judgment. 6'
This position has been severely criticized by many authorities. One
writer describes the government as, in effect, "robbing Peter to pay Paul's
taxes."' 62 The inequities of this situation certainly are gross. The
government can remain silent while the mechanic increases the value of
the taxpayer's property. Then the federal lien can be assessed anytime
thereafter, take priority over the mechanic's lien if it has not been re-
duced to judgment, and receive the benefits of the enhanced value of the
property. Throughout these proceedings the mechanic's lienor lacks
any method of protecting himself. The arguments made in favor of these
decisions seems very weak by comparison. One proposition is that there
is no actual distinction between the "mechanic" who works on the
construction of a building and one who works on the construction of
furniture. Thus, there should be no lien in the first place. This, of course,
is highly unrealistic. One or two weeks pay of the craftsman does not
approach the value a contractor contributes to the real property. Then,
there is the assertion that federal tax revenues would be impaired. Again,
this ignores the practical economics involved. The very property the
158. 358 U.S. 66, reversing 102 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1958).
159. 350 U.S. 1010 (1956).
160. See also United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808, reversing 224 Miss. 33, 79 So.2d
474 (1955). This also was a per curiam reversal without opinion.
161. 350 U.S. 1010, 1011 (1956), by Justices Harlan and Douglas.
162. Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAx. L. REV. 247, 459
(1958).
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government's lien attaches to in the first place would not be available
if the mechanic's lienor had not created it.
The foregoing discussion applies mainly to the situation in which
the mechanic's lien and the federal tax lien are both filed against the
owner of the property. However, the more common situation is when the
federal lien is asserted, not against the owner of the property, but against
the general contractor who has a contract with the owner. In this situ-
ation, it is the sub-contractor who then is competing with the federal lien
for the proceeds of the contract due the general contractor. Depending
upon the state's mechanic's lien law, these circumstances can produce
results contrary to the situation first discussed. In Aquilino v. United
States,163 New York property law made the general contractor's right
of recovery a trust fund, to be applied first for the benefit of sub-con-
tractors. The New York Court of Appeals, relying on White Bear and
other prior decisions of the Supreme Court, held the sub-contractor's
rights inchoate by federal standards. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the contractor never had any "property" or
"property rights" as defined by state law, so the federal lien never had
anything to which it could attach. A companion case, United States v.
Durham Lunber Co.,6 was disposed of similarly, the Court stating:
[S]ince under North Carolina law the taxpayers [i.e., the con-
tractor] possessed merely a right to the residue of the fund and
since the Government's tax lien attached to the property
interests of the taxpayers as defined by state law, the Govern-
ment can recover only "so much of the construction price as
will remain unpaid after the owners have deducted a sum
sufficient to pay the subcontractors.Y5
There has been speculation that these decisions indicate a change
in the Court's position in regard to its "choate" test. However, it seems
to this writer that the decisions only illustrate the Court's meticulous
regard for the principles discussed at the outset of this section.'66 In
these two cases, the priority question was never reached because the first
principle, "the property of the taxpayer," was decisive. What these
decisions do have to offer is an invitation to state legislatures to change
their mechanic's lien laws so that at least sub-contractors will have some
protection against the federal lien.
c. Lis Pendens
When the mechanic's lien case of White Bear was first decided it
raised the fear that the common-law principles of lis pendens did not
163. 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
164. 363 U.S. 522 (1960).
165. Id. at 525-26.
166. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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apply to the government. Under this doctrine, any person who acquires
rights to real property affected by pending litigation takes with notice of
such litigation and must appear in the action and assert his rights or he
will be estopped by the judgment and cannot thereafter question its
validity. 6 7 Otherwise, a real estate lawyer foreclosing on a mortgage,
for example, would have to search for revenue liens every day until the
sale, in order to join the United States. In White Bear, the Court did not
squarely decide this question, but the fact was that the tax lien did arise
in the midst of the suit and was enforced against the purchaser after the
sale.168
The decision in the Brosnan'69 case seems to have had a settling effect
on this situation. In a letter to the ABA in 1961, the acting chief counsel
of the IRS said:
In view of the Court's decision [Brosnan] it would seem that
you need only look to state statutes and decisions to determine
whether the junior liens are discharged under the fact situation
[lis pendens] outlined in your letter. 7°
d. Attachment and Garnishment Liens
In Florida, as in other jurisdictions, a suit begun by attachment or
garnishment generally gives the attaching creditor prior rights to the prop-
erty against subsequent creditors, although actual judgment is obtained at
a later date. 17 ' However, when competing with the federal lien, attach-
ment or garnishment liens give no protection whatsoever. The case which
introduced the "choate doctrine" to the general lien field settled this
question as early as 1950. In United States v. Security Trust & Say.
Bank,'172 an attachment lien was filed against four parcels of real estate,
and thereafter a federal lien arose. Although final judgment was rendered
in the suit, the Court held the federal lien was still superior because the
attachment lien was "contingent or inchoate-merely a lis pendens notice
that a right to perfect a lien exists." 73
167. 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 1 (1948).
168. See note 159 supra.
169. See note 130 supra.
170. Proceedings American Bar Association, Section of Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law, at 81 (1961). This opinion is in conformity with the case of Ward v. Congress
Constr. Co., 99 Fed. 598 (7th Cir. 1900), which held that the doctrine of lis pendens applied
to the United States the same as any other subsequent claimant and that sovereign immunity
from suit did not require a different result. See also Puritan Dairy Prods. Co. v. Chris-
toffers, 54 N.J. Super. 102, 148 A.2d 223 (1959).
171. FLA. STAT. chs. 76 (attachment), 77 (garnishment) (1961).
172. 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
173. Id. at 50. See also United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S.
215 (1955) (involving a garnishment of personal property) ; United States v. Acri, 348 U.S.
211 (1955) (attachment involving personal property).
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e. Landlords' Liens
A similar situation exists in regard to landlord liens. In United
States v. Scovil'7 4 the Supreme Court decided that a landlord's distress
lien was not perfected in the federal sense at the time the federal lien
arose. Under South Carolina law, the tenant had five days to post
a bond to free the property from the lien. As this period had not elapsed,
the lien was considered "inchoate."'1
f. Municipal Liens
Local tax liens have fared no better against the federal lien than
the previously discussed private liens. Municipal assessments, not
actually fixed before the federal lien arises, are considered inchoate and
subordinate to the federal lien.170 To attain the required choateness, the
taxing unit must reduce the claim to judgment (not a statutory judg-
ment) 7 7 and do whatever else is required to make the judgment a
lien. 7 s
Real estate taxes seem to be an exception to this rule. In United
States v. City of New Britain, 9 a lien for in rem property taxes was
deemed to be choate by the Supreme Court. This, incidentally, was the
one occasion on which the Supreme Court has ever found a private lien
choate. Apparently the lien met the test because it had attached to
specific property and was enforceable without a suit. Unfortunately, it
seems that this is virtually the only type of lien that will satisfy the choate
test.
The fact that after a federal lien arises all subsequent local taxes
are subordinate presents a grim prospect for local tax collectors. As
long as the lien remains unpaid, it is very unlikely that anyone would
buy the property at a local tax sale knowing the federal lien is senior.
The net effect is to all but take the property off the tax rolls, in most cases.
174. 348 U.S. 218 (1955), reversing 224 S.C. 233, 78 S.E.2d 277 (1953).
175. See also In re Uni-Lab, Inc., 282 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1960) ; United States v.
Weissman, 135 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
176. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
177. United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953). The tax lien here was
designated by the state to have the effect of a judgment, but the Court said that it was
not a judgment in the conventional sense, and hence that it was inferior to the federal lien.
It seems incongruous to force the state to get a court judgment which would stand the
choate test when the statute creating the judgment lien was passed specifically to expedite
the proceedings.
178. Ersa, Inc. v. Dudley, 234 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1956). In Gilbert, supra note 177,
the property in question had been sold to the locality for taxes, and yet the lien was still
held inchoate on the grounds that the "taxpayer had not been divested by the Town of
either title or possession." Id. at 366. Thus, it seems that in § 3466 cases, of which this is one,
a fourth requirement has been added to the choate test.
179. Note 176 supra.
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g. Attorneys' Liens
This discussion would not be complete, nor appropriate, until the
priority of the attorney's lien was examined. Here again, the choateness
test has had its effects. It now appears that fees incurred in any con-
nection with a mortgage foreclosure prior to the sale'80 will be sub-
ordinated to the federal lien. However, when the attorney creates the
property or fund to which the federal lien attaches, the law is not yet
settled. In United States v. Goldstein,'' the attorney was retained by the
taxpayer corporation to represent it on a twenty-five per cent retainer
agreement in a condemnation proceeding. After an award in its favor
was made, a federal lien was filed against the taxpayer corporation. The
attorney claimed his twenty-five per cent on the basis that he created
the fund, but the district court held the lien inchoate and subordinate
to the federal lien. In United States v. Coblentz,5 2 on similar facts,
the New York Appellate Division ruled in favor of the attorney, holding
that an attorney's lien was a property right to which the federal lien
did not attach. There was no discussion at all of the choateness of the
lien. The government's petition for certiorari surprisingly was denied.
This state of affairs creates a dilemma for the attorney who undertakes
litigation on a contingent fee basis for a client against whom a lien is
already filed. The best solution would seem to be for the attorney to
extract an agreement from the government before the litigation begins,
by pointedly reminding the government attorneys that unless he is paid,
there will be no money at all from which the lien can be paid.
4. SUMMARY
From Security Trust 8' to Ball,"14 the decisions leave little doubt
as to the government's supremacy as a creditor. The rule that federal
law controls the issue of priorities and a strict application of the choate-
ness test have combined to swing the pendulum from government sub-
ordination to state created liens, to complete subordination of almost
180. United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 895 (1960) ;
American Sur. Co. v. Sundberg, 58 Wash. 2d 337, 363 P.2d 99 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 989 (1962).
United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955), involved
insurance proceeds for which the United States was a competing claimant. The Supreme
Court disallowed a $500 attorney fee to the insurance company that interpleaded the fund.
Cf. United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 357 S.W.2d 653 (Ark. 1962), rev'd, 83 Sup. Ct.
1651 (1963). The Arkansas court had held that the mortgagee's right to an allowance became
choate at the same date when default was made in a mortgage payment-which was before
the federal lien was filed against the owner. The court added, "while attorneys love their
work, they do not work entirely for love."
181. United States v. Pay-O-Matic Corp., 162 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Goldstein, 256 F.2d 581 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958),
rehearing denied, 359 U.S. 985 (1959).
182. 5 N.V.2d 300, 157 N.E.2d 587, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 841 (1960).
183. See note 107 supra.
184. See note 114 supra.
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all security interests competing with the federal lien. The question now
is, what lies ahead?
There is little reason to believe the Court is going to change its
basic approach to the priorities question. As late as 1960, the Court
said in Aquilino v. United States:
The application of state law in ascertaining the taxpayer's
property rights and of federal law in reconciling the claims of
competing lienors is based both upon logic and sound legal
principles. This approach strikes a proper balance between the
legitimate and traditional interest which the State has in cre-
ating and defining the property interest of its citizens, and the
necessity for a uniform administration of the federal revenue
statutes. 8 5
It is clearly discernible that the Court is still satisfied that this policy
is the best approach to the conflicting state and federal interests in-
volved. However, the recent cases also show some indications that the
Court realizes the serious impact this policy is having on the commercial
world, and is searching for a way to compromise its harsh effects, without
overruling all that it has done in the past years.
The Brosnan decision, which refused to extend the priority approach
to the mortgage foreclosure field, and held state law effective, may be one
of these indications. The language of the opinion was especially sig-
nificant:
It must be recognized that the factors supporting a federal rule
of uniformity in this field, and those militating against the dis-
location of long-standing state procedures are full of competing
considerations. They involve many imponderables which this
Court is ill-equipped to assess, on which Congress has not yet
'spoken, and which we think are best left to that body to deal
with in light of their full illumination. A wise solution of such
a far-reaching problem cannot be achieved within the confines
of a lawsuit.' 86
For the first time, 'the Court seemed to recognize the hazards of judicial
legislation. Certainly, the same conflict the Court mentions in the
mortgage foreclosure area, i.e., federal uniformity versus "dislocation
of long-standing state procedure," existed thirteen years ago in the priority
field. Perhaps the hesitance of the Court to extend federal control to the
foreclosure field indicates its remorse in acting in the priority area where
Congress should have spoken first.
Other indications that the Court is attempting to mitigate the force
185. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 514 (1960).
186. United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 251-52 (1960).
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of its earlier decisions are seen in the Aquilino and Durham cases .
Technically, these decisions did not violate the Court's long-standing
formula for deciding priority questions. However, by distinguishing the
cases on the "property of the taxpayer" principle, the court impliedly
upheld the state's right to confer a lesser interest in the taxpayer, thereby
limiting the federal lien in the same way as a competing choate lien
would reduce a larger property interest initially conferred. Certainly,
the net effect of these cases conflicts directly with the Court's previously
stated intention to enforce uniform standards of tax collection. The
dissent in Aquilino noted this fact in its argument that state property
concepts should not be permitted "to control the extent of a Federal
lien's application in situations indistinguishable from those where the
Court has in fact, rightly or wrongly, enforced a uniform Federal
Rule." ' There is no doubt that if the Court continues to try to remedy
the situation by resorting to judicial circuity, the priority picture will
undoubtedly become more confused and difficult than it already is.
In the words of Justice Harlan:
If the standard of choateness is thought to be an undesirable
restriction on the States' freedom to regulate property relation-
ships, the cases establishing that standard should be expressly
overruled and not emasculated by dubious distinctions.'89
CONCLUSION
Clearly, the whole area of federal tax lien law needs remedial action
immediately. There is no legitimate reason, for example, why the federal
lien should be kept secret. On the contrary, the fear of a secret lien
may stifle lending and limit the growth of the economy-a result which
could be avoided by enactment of a general notice statute.
The priority situation also has long been in need of congressional
guidance. It is an area pregnant with public policy questions that can
only be settled by legislative action.'
187. See notes 163 and 164 supra.
188. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 516 (1960).
189. Id. at 521. ,
190. The American Bar Association has proposed legislation in this area. See S. 1193,
H.R. 4319, H.R. 4320, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See note 100 supra.
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